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where the action would be burdensome and expensive to the defendant'or cause the defendant irreparable damage and give the plaintiff an
inequitable and unfair advantage.1s Other jurisdictions do likewise. 19
Federal receivers were not involved in these suits. In Mc Connell v.
Thompson2O the Indiana court refused to enjoin a plaintiff from bringing an action in a federal court in another state because of the right
given the plaintiff under the Federal Employers Liability Act. It
held this was a right given by Congress with which the state court
could not interfere. The court distinguished its decision from that in
Kern v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co.21
which held that an Indiana court could enjoin the bringing of an action under the Federal Employers Liability Act in a foreign state
court. The United States Supreme Court held in Douglas v. Ncw York
Railroad Co. 22 that the jurisdiction of the state courts is concurrent
with that of th- federal couils in regard to actions under the Federal
Emphl.: eis Liability Act. Therefore, it seems illogical, since the
jurisdiction of the federal and state courts is concurrent, that the
Indiana court - ould enjoin the maintenance of an action in a foreign
:tate court and refuse to do so if the action is pursued in a federal
court.
RIGHTS OF FIREMEN UNDER THE INDIANA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
City of Fort Wayne v. Hazelett
The plaintiff filed a claim under the Workmens Compensation Act
for compensation for the death of her husband resulting from an
accidental injury suffered while in the performance of his duties as a
fireman of the City of Fort Wayne. The Industrial Board awarded
compensation, and the City appealed. Held, for appellant. A fireman
in the service of the municipality is not an employee within the scope
of the act.'
The Indiana Act provides that "'employer' shall include . . . any
municipal corporation within the state ... using the services of another
for pay," and "'employee' shall include every person in the service of
another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or
implied."' 2 The sole question presented by the principal case is whether
Kern v. The Clev., Cin., Chi. and St. Louis Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185
N.E. 446 (1933).
28Cleveland, Cin., Chi. and St. Louis Ry. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273,
170 N.E. 328 (1932).
' Reeds Administratrix v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W.
794 (1918).
20213 Ind. 16, 8 N.E.(2d) 986, 11 N.E.(2d), 183 (1937),
21204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446 (1933).
22 Douglas v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377,
49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. ed 747 (1929).
,City of Fort Wayne v. Hazlett, 23 N.E.(2d) 610 (Ind. App. 1939).
- Ind. Acts 1929, c. 172, § 73, p. 536; BURNS IND. STAT.ANN. (1933)
4 40-1701.
'

NOTES AND COMMENTS

or not a member of a city fire department is an employee within the
scope of this act.
The question may be thus resolved: Is the person sdeking recovery
under the Workmens Compsensation Act, whose employer is a governmental agency, an "employee" or a "public officer? "3 The remuneration
accompanying a governmental office is held to be an incident of that
office, a mere stipulation accompanying the office to enable the officer
better to perform his duties.4 As to those who are not officers, there
is, in the absence of any express agreement, an implied obligation on
the part of the employer to pay for his services. 5 This would lead
to the conclusion that the existence of a contract of hire is a result of
the determination as to whether or not there exists an office or an
employment, and not a test for such determination.
A number of tests have been applied by the courts to determine
whether one in the service of the public is an officer or an employee,
so that considerable confusion is apparent in the field. 6 One of the
principal tests that has been applied is that based on the exercise of
sovereign authority. If there is vested in the servant any authority to
exercise a measure of the sovereign powers he is held to be a public
officer.7 The fact that a person serves in the performance of what is
a governmental function should not be conclusive, for he is not by that
fact that vested with sovereign authority.8
Another test arises in those cases where it has been held that one
cannot be an officer unless his position is created as such by law.9 That
the position or even its duties are provided for by law is not conclusive;
3But one may be neither an officer nor an employee under contract. See Schmueser v. Copelin, 99 Ind. App. 209, 192 N. E. 123
(1934); In re Moore, 97 Ind. App. 492, 187 N. E. 219 (1933).
4 Sibley v. State, 89 Conn. 682, 96 Atl. 161 (1915) ; State v. Hawklns, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228 (1886); Leonard v. Terre Haute, 48
Ind. App. 104, 93 N. E. 872 (1911).
r,1 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.Ed.1936) 1 36; Lockwood v. Robbins,
125 Ind. 398, 25 N. E. 455 (1890); Weesner v. Weesner, 71 Ind. App.
237, 124 N. E. 710 (1919); Louisville N. A. & C. R. R. v. Hubbard,
116 Ind. 193, 18 N. E. 611 (1888); Palmer v. Miller, 19 Ind. App. 624,
49 N. E. 975 (1898).
6 1 DIECHEM, PUBLIC OFCERS (1890) p. 1 ff. See State ex rel. Barney
v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 Pac. 411 (1927); 53 A. L. R. 583, 595
(1928).
7 St. Joseph County v. Claeys, 103 Ind. App. 192, 5 N. E.(2d)
1008 (1937); Reissner v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 103 Ind. App. 202,
4 N. E.(2d) 581 (1936); State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Jennings,
57 Ohio St. 415, 49 N. E. 404 (1898); cf. Shelmadine v. Elkhart, 75
Ind. App. 493, 129 N. E. 878 (1920); State v. Nattkemper, 86 Ind.
App. 85, 156 N. E. 168 (1926); Brinson v. Board of Commissioners,
97 Ind. App. 354, 186 N. E. 891 (1933); Keene v. Board of Comm'rs
of Jasper County, 105 Ind. App. 641, 16 N. E. (2d) 967 (1938) ; McNally
v. Saginaw, 197 Mich. 106, 163 N. W. 1015 (1917).
8 Atlanta v. Hatcher. 31 Ga. App. 611, 121 S. E. 864 (1924). cf
St. Joseph County v. Claeys, 103 Ind. App. 192, 5 N. E. (2d) 1008
1937): Reissner v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 103 Ind. App. 202, 4 N. E.
(2d) 581 (1936).
8 St. Joseph County v. Claeys, 103 Ind. App. 192, 5 N. E.( (2d) 1008
(1937); Mason v. Los Angeles, 130 Cal. App. 224, 20 P.(2d) -84
(1933) ; Murphy v. Industrial Comm., 355 fI1. 419, 189 N. E. 302 (1934).
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lie position must be established as an office.1o Other facts, as whether
or not a person is required to give bond or take oath, are sometimes
considered but are merely evidentiary.1
It seems that there are really
but two basic tests for determining if a position is a public office.
Either it must be specifically created as such by law or there must be
delegated to it some portion of the sovereign powers. It is not evident
that these elements are present in the case of a fireman.
The court in the principal case apparently assigns as the main
reason for its decision the fact that the selection of members of city
fire departments is regulated by statute,12 so that the city is not under
complete freedom of contract in such matters; and thus concludes that
a fireman does not serve under "contract of hire." But the mere fact
that the city is not under complete freedom of contra(t is of no conrequence, for this would not preclude the formation of a contract of
hire."3

9[h( proposition that the statute providing for firemen's pensions,
Y'eing in existence at the time the Workmens Compensation Act was
passed, creates a presumption that the legislature did not intend to
include firemen within the coverage of the latter act may offer a sufficient basis for the principal decision. But pensions generally are
held to be bonuses only, and are paid in consideration of past services.' 4
Benefits provided for by the Workmens Compensation Acts on the
other hand, are considered to be compensation for injuries sustained
and losses resulting therefrom.1
Thus it has been held that the two
acts, being founded on different theories, are not inconsistent, and
that a recovery under one should not preclude a recovery under the
other.16 The validity of this distinction in Indiana depends on whether
10 St. Joseph County v. Claeys, 103 Ind. App. 192, 5 N. E. (2d)
1008 (1937); Murphy v. Industrial Comm., 355 Ill. 419, 189 N. E. 302
(1934).
11 Shelmadine v. Elkhart, 75 Ind. App. 493, 129 N. E. 878 (1920);
State v. Nattkemper, 86 Ind. App. 85, 156 N. E. 168 (1926); Keene
%.Board of Comm'rs of Jasper County, 105 Ind. App. 641, 16 N. E.
(2d) 967 (1938); Blynn v. Pontiac, 185 Mich. 35, 151 N. W. 681 (1915).
12 Ind. Acts 1905, c. 129, HI 159, 160, 1933, c. 86, § 1935, c. 282,
§ 1, BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. (1933), §§ 48-6102, 48-6105.
13 For other examples of statutory limitations on the freedom of
contract, see Indiana statutes relating to hiring of teachers: BURNS
IND.

STAT. ANN.

(1933),

H§ 28-4304 to 4310, 23-4314, 28-5005.

The

Indiana court has held teachers to be employees rather than officers
of the school corporation. Kostanzer v. State ex rel. Ramsey, 205 Ind.
536, 187 N. E. 337 (1933). Another instance of such limitations is
apparent in the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S.
C. A., § 151 ff. .The ability of employer and employee to enter into
contract relations cannot be disputed under this act.
14 Dickey v. Jackson, 181 Iowa 1155, 165 N. W. 387 (1917).
15 Jackson v. Wilde, 52 Cal. App. 259, 198 Pac. 822 (1921).
-0 Dickey v. Jackson, 181 Iowa 1155, 165 N. W. 387 (1917); Jackson v. Wilde, 52 Cal. App. 259, 198 Pac. 822 (1921); Markley v. St.
Paul, 142 Minn. 356, 172 N. W. 215 (1919). But cf. Bross v. Detroit,
262 Mich. 447, 247 N. W. 714 (1933). Where a distinction is based
on the fact that firemen pay for the protection afforded by the pension
system, see State v. District Court, 134 Minn. 26, 158 N. W. 790 (1916).
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the courts hold that payments under the pension statute are in the
1
nature of a bonus or compensation.'
The principal case is in accord with the general weight of authority throughout the United States. The answer to the problem presented,
however, depends largely on the peculiar wording of the particular
statutes involved.' 8 In Indiana, firemen have been held to be municipal employees for other purposes.' 9 No sufficient reason is apparent
20
why any distinction should be made for the purposes of this act.
Moreover, in view of the general terminology used in the act to define "employer" and "employee", and of the avowed purpose of the
courts to extend the coverage of the act in so far as possible,21 it is
believed that a better result would have been to hold that firemen are
"employees" under the Workmens Compensation Act.

ATTACHMENT OF INCOME OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
Schwager v. Schwager
Defendant is beneficiary of a spend-thrift trust set up by his
mother's will subsequent to divorce of son by his first wife. The will
provided that if the trustees apprehend that the interest of the beneficiary is threatened to be diverted they shall divert the income and
principal from distribution to the defendant and use the same as they
deem expedient to support and maintenance of the beneficiary and
members of his family then dependent on him for support, not however,
including his first wife or any of his children by her. The plaintiffs,
divorced wife and children (two of whom are minors), sue to attach
the income or corpus of the trust for alimony and support. Held,
No recovery allowed; under Wisconsin law a testator may dispose of
his property as his judgment may dictate, the courts cannot change
or modify a will or substitute in its place one which they deem more
equitable or just.1
Trusts in which the interest of the beneficiary cannot be assigned
by him or reached by his creditors have come to be known as "spendthrift trusts". It is immaterial whether or not the beneficiary is in
fact a spendthrift. The purpose of the settlor in creating the trust
is to protect the beneficiary against his own folly, inefficiency or misfortune.2 Cases upholding the restraint of alienation of trust income
IND. STAT. ANN. (1933), H 48-6506, 6507.
IsMcDonald v. New Haven, 94 Conn. 403, 109 Atl. 176, 10 A. L. R.
193, 201 (1920). See Note (1932), 81 A. L. R. 478; Stene, Application
of State Workmen's Compensation Laws to Public Employees and Officers (1932), 17 Minn. L. Rev. 162.
19 City of Peru v. State ex rel. McGuire, 210 Ind. 668, 119 N. E.
151 (1936).
20 SEE Fabler v. City of Minot, 49 N. Dak. 960, 194 N. W. 695
(1923).
23 McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839 (1922);
In re Duncan, 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289 (1919).
'Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F. (2d) 754 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940).
2 SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) 742.
27 BURNS

